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The Monsoon and the Market for Money in Late-colonial India
1
 
 
Abstract 
Banking experienced large growth in colonial India along with a process of 
commercialization of agriculture. Yet, the rate of aggregate saving or investment remained 
low. The paper is an attempt to resolve this paradox. It suggests that traditional forms of 
banking were helped by the formalization of indigenous negotiable instruments, but that 
transactions between bankers, merchants, and peasants were characterized by a limited use of 
legal instruments. The limited circulation of bills in this sphere is attributed, among other 
factors, to high seasonality in the demand for money. Seasonality-induced distortions in the 
organization of the money market made indigenous banking an unsuitable agent to promote 
saving and finance industrialization. 
 
The development of financial services in colonial India (1858-1947) presents the 
historian with several paradoxes. Between 1870 and 1930, a manifold increase in the volume 
of credit enabled growth in cultivation and India’s emergence as a major exporter of 
agricultural commodities in the world. The process began in the middle of the nineteenth 
century with rising export of food-grains and cotton and construction of irrigation canals and 
railways, and lasted until the Great Depression. The financial needs of merchants and 
producers were met by the indigenous “informal” sector, that is, family firms engaged in 
banking and moneylending. Despite the growth of their business, indigenous bankers rarely 
invested money in modern industry like the cotton textile mills. With the exception of a few 
                                                          
1
 Accepted for publication in Enterprise and Society. I wish to thank the readers of the 
journal and the editors for comments and suggestions that led to significant improvements 
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Development in the Anthropocene: Perspectives on Asia and Africa, in the Centre for 
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textile firms of Ahmedabad, industry tended to be financed by mercantile profits, public 
shareholding, and public deposits. And despite the growth of indigenous banking, the rates of 
aggregate saving and investment remained exceedingly low in the early twentieth century.
2
 
Indigenous bankers met the needs of agriculture but diversified little and had little noticeable 
effect on saving habit. 
The paper is an attempt to explain these successes and failures of banking in India in 
the era of globalization. The success is easily explained. The long-established commercial 
networks in South Asia had nurtured large banking firms. The biggest of these firms were 
based in the trading cities, especially the port cities. They had a diversified portfolio and 
routinely dealt with other bankers and merchants. A key feature of their operation was the 
extensive use of negotiable instruments, especially a group of instruments collectively known 
as “hundi”. The common meaning of hundi was a banker’s draft or promissory note, though 
sometimes merchants’ bills of exchange were also called hundi. Hundi was partially covered 
by an important piece of British Indian legislation, the Negotiable Instruments Act (1881).
3
 
More than legislation, the reputation of the acceptors as banking houses, and the customary 
law and conventions that they followed, ensured that the hundis they issued were discounted 
by the corporate banks, the largest of which were partially European owned and based in the 
port cities. The discounting of hundis, therefore, made for an area of convergence and 
cooperation between modern and traditional banking firms. In other words, their inherited 
institutional strengths and colonial legal intervention together helped these bankers expand 
their business. 
The business of agricultural lending in the villages and small towns involved a very 
different institutional setup and different sets of actors from those described above. Even the 
large banking firms had some exposure to agriculture, but they rarely dealt with the peasants 
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and local grain merchants directly. Those who mainly dealt with the peasants needed to adapt 
to a specific geographical condition. The conduct of agriculture under tropical monsoon 
conditions was marked by extreme seasonal fluctuations in the pace of economic activity. 
The monsoon concentrated rainfall into a two-to-three-month span in an otherwise hot and 
arid region, thus squeezing the sowing season, when peasants needed credit, and the harvest 
season, when the trade needed credit, into short time spans, sometimes as short as two-to-
three weeks. In the busy season, bankers needed to expand credit a lot and very quickly. 
Local banking adapted to the unpredictable fluctuations in demand in a variety of ways. They 
usually dealt in the most liquid of assets, such as cash and gold, made unsecured loans, relied 
on their personal knowledge of the clients, insisted on short-term loans, and avoided deposit 
banking which would add a non-seasonal liability. The rest of the year was the slack season 
when circulation of money in the countryside greatly reduced in extent. 
The “failure” of the financial market consisted in the facts that the seasonality-
induced institutional features limited financial intermediation in the economy at large, and 
that seasonal fluctuations in interest rates persisted.
4
 The persistence of huge inter-year 
fluctuations in interest rates were a sign that the banking business failed to increase credit 
sufficiently in the busy season without running into unsustainable default, and failed to 
deploy surplus funds profitably in the depressed months.
5
 Poor legislation reinforced these 
                                                          
4 Raymond Goldsmith found that the level of financial intermediation was relatively low in 
interwar India. Financial Development. Across emerging economies of the time, the level 
was not highly correlated with per capita income, even though all showed a rise in 
intermediation in the long run. 
5 Climate-induced variations in demand for credit were a much bigger problem for India than 
for many other large economies of the twentieth century. Some indicative data exist to 
support the claim. For example, comparison of Indian data with a dataset compiled by Simon 
Kuznets on pre-Depression USA would show that the amplitude of inter-year variation in 
interest rates in colonial India was significantly larger than that in the contemporary USA. 
Kuznets, “Seasonal Variations.” In Kuznets’ dataset on US seasonal values, the interest and 
discount rates for 1916-31 had coefficients of variation (cv) of 0.01-0.05. The numbers in 
Chart 2 below tracking the bank rate in India have a cv varying from 0.12 (1914-6) to 0.24 
(1874-6). In 1874, the ratio of peak to slack season rate was 2:1; in Kuznets, the commercial 
6 
 
syndromes. Lenders in agricultural credit did not usually transact by means of negotiable 
instruments. The acceptors of hundi were too remote and unknown to the merchants, 
moneylenders, and peasants engaged in local trade. Legislation on negotiable instrument was 
piecemeal in that it did not extend to local moneylending and to the contractual documents 
that were potentially usable in agricultural transactions. A string of provincial laws restricting 
land mortgage posed obstacles to the use of the mortgage document as a negotiable 
instrument. There were other hurdles to legislation. The diverse profile of the actors, many of 
whom were merchants and bankers of small resources, and immense variation in local 
conventions would have made designing a proper legal framework for bills a frustrating 
enterprise. Therefore, the financial system was poorly equipped to spread credit between 
seasons and types of borrower. 
These arguments about the pattern and quality of financial market development lead 
to two larger points about the evolution of the institutions of capitalism in colonial India, and 
the implications of that process for economic growth. Economic and business history offers 
contradictory accounts of how institutions of capitalism evolved in India. One view that we 
can identify with the historiography of society in colonial India, including the history of 
business communities, suggests that the key institutions were mainly endogenous, caste 
norms and community networks, for example.
6
 Another view that we can identify with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
paper rates varied in the ratio 102:100. How generalizable these comparisons are cannot be 
said, because seasonal financial data are not easily available. Kuznets compiled the data from 
a belief that unaccounted for seasonality distorted national income estimates. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, economists modelled seasonal variation in consumption, wages, poverty, and 
business cycle, from an understanding that these variations, if unaccounted for, vitiated 
monetary policy analysis, specification of the demand for money function, theories of 
business cycles, and the design of anti-poverty policies. Miron, “Economics of Seasonal 
Cycles;” Sahn, ed., Seasonal Variability; Barth and Bennett, “Seasonal Variation.” Some of 
these contributions made use of the Kuznets dataset. Directly, these literatures contribute 
little to the present paper. 
6
 “Particularistic caste loyalties”, writes one well-known work on a business community, “are 
the secret of success in Indian entrepreneurship,” Timberg, The Marwaris, p. 17. Caste-based 
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“new institutional economic history” suggests that the key institutions were exogenous, for 
example, colonial legislation inspired by the western juridical tradition.
7
 The paper offers a 
revision to these perspectives by suggesting that geography impinged on the working of both 
indigenous tradition and colonial law. Secondly, because the financial system entailed limited 
capacity for intermediation, it had limited capacity to support industrialization. The tropical 
monsoon climate made for an economic system that went from boom to bust every six 
months, year after year. Banking was geared to meeting the peak credit demand, but by the 
use of means that forced bankers to keep capital idle in the depressed months, starving non-
agricultural businesses of money even when money was idle. 
The rest of the paper shows how this financial system functioned. It is divided into 
five main sections. The next section locates the study in a chronological narrative of rural 
credit. While the chronological narrative supplies a reason for an investigation into the 
organization of the market, the main intent of the paper is a static one, to understand how a 
structural-geographical condition shaped the organization. The subsequent sections 
concentrate on this issue. The sections deal with interest rates, seasonality, financial 
institutions, and implications of money market organization for saving and investment, with 
data that mainly come from the 1920s. The concluding section reflects on the relevance of the 
study for a comparative history of capitalism. 
 
[MAP] 
 
The history of rural credit in colonial India 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enforcement of credit contracts is discussed in Wolcott, “Examination of the Supply of 
Financial Credit.”  
7
 That the institutions of modern capitalism in the non-western world derived from European 
settlement and colonization is popular among some economists. For one example, see 
Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail. 
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 At the heart of the narrative of financial market development in colonial India is the 
story of commercialization of agriculture. There was agricultural trade in the region before. 
But the scale increased between 1870 and 1930. For example, the volume of grain and cotton 
exports increased threefold in this time span. Like regimes before, the British colonial state 
depended heavily on taxes collected from land. The fiscal imperative and growing demand in 
Britain for food and industrial raw material made the Indian government take interest in 
agriculture. The two most important areas of state intervention were construction of irrigation 
canals in northern India (c. 1850-1938), and the creation of absolute private property in land 
(1793-1820). From around 1870, the railways started to reduce trade costs significantly along 
routes connecting the agricultural interior with the ports. Cultivated area about doubled 
during 1870-1930. 
As far as one can measure, between 1870 and 1930, the volume of credit linked to 
agricultural trades increased by 2-300 per cent in real terms. Who supplied this money? The 
more organized end of the money market consisted of indigenous banking firms owned by 
families that had been doing this business for generations. Many were earlier based in towns 
situated on the overland and riverborne trade routes, such as Benares, Mathura, Delhi, or 
Jaipur. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century a number of these families relocated to the 
port cities, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. These firms rarely funded peasants, but dealt with 
other bankers, big merchants, townsmen, and sometimes industrial firms. The local money 
market that funded the grain merchants and the peasants consisted of a more diverse set of 
actors, who included traditional banking families as well as a number of people who were 
new to the credit business or did it on the side. Indian banking firms were variously known as 
shroffs, sahukars, mahajans, and pedhis. 
Corporate or joint-stock banking began in the early nineteenth century, but 
experienced rapid growth only in the twentieth. Corporate banks consisted of a number of 
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constituents, including the exchange banks, licensed to deal in foreign currency transactions, 
the partially government-owned Presidency banks, the Indian corporate banks, and a group of 
small quasi-banks like cooperative credit societies, loan offices, and land mortgage banks. 
The Presidency Banks were the Bank of Bengal (1806), Bank of Bombay (1840) and the 
Bank of Madras (1843). These functioned partly as the government’s banker, and were 
amalgamated to form the Imperial Bank in 1921. These banks and private joint-stock banks 
handled domestic trade and remittance. Like the Indian bankers, few of these banks directly 
lent agricultural credit. But they did deal with the Indian bankers, mainly by accepting bills 
issued by the latter. 
 Economic history scholarship tells us little about how this network functioned. The 
core theme in the historiography of rural credit is not financial institution, but property right 
in land. In the standard narrative, absolute ownership right made land an attractive collateral. 
Market shocks, revenue burden, or poverty induced peasants to borrow too much. Where land 
belonged to substantial landlords, tenant farmers fell into debt dependency upon the 
landlords. Much of this scholarship, influenced by Marxist-Leninist class analysis, has 
explored how the indebted peasant became an example of “dislocations wrought by colonial 
rule”.8 The evidence for a debt-driven impoverishment is controversial, but that debate is not 
relevant here. 
Business history has paid more attention to how the network functioned. From this 
literature, we can derive two useful propositions. First, indigenous bankers and indigenous 
negotiable instruments (hundi) met the busy season demand for money.
9
 Secondly, the money 
market was segmented, among other reasons because all lenders applied selection of clients 
based on personal information. These segmentation rules were informal in that they were not 
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 Bose, ed., Credit, Markets, p. 11. 
9
 Bagchi, Evolution; Bagchi, “Introduction”; Ray, “Asian Capital”; Ray, “Indigenous 
banking.”  
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recognized in law. For example, the indigenous bankers charged lower rates for transactions 
among members of their own caste or community. The European bankers of Calcutta 
similarly were more lax with European clients.
10
 Beyond anecdotes, we do not know enough 
about why specialization emerged in the credit business. 
One obvious difference between metropolitan and local banking was in respect of 
laws regulating negotiable instruments. The fact that the bank rate (interest rate in inter-bank 
transactions, see Chart 1) did not rise even as credit demand rose in the course of 
commercialization suggests that metropolitan banking was sufficiently flexible as an 
institution. In other words, the negotiability of the bills in circulation in this sphere improved 
in the long run. Negotiability improved owing to some positive changes. To some extent, the 
big banking firms shared information and clientele. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the colonial government enacted a number of laws relating to contract and 
contractual procedure. These included the Negotiable Instruments Act (1881). Thereafter, a 
few disputes on hundis came to the courts. The hundi remained a poorly regulated instrument 
even after legislation. The judges often had difficulty understanding what it was and had to 
call in experts. The Act may well have been an attempt to only collect a transaction tax.
11
 
Nevertheless, its very presence made the hundi more transparent and standardized in form. 
If law aided institutional development among metropolitan bankers, it had an opposite 
effect in local banking. Land mortgage loans came to be regulated by a number of provincial 
laws designed to stop indebted peasants losing their land. The two most famous interventions 
were the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act (1879) and the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900). 
How serious the problem of land alienation was cannot be ascertained. The rate of land 
transfer tended to be low even without the laws. After the Indian Mutiny (1857), officers 
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 More on the disputes, Martin, “Economic History.” 
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were often unduly nervous about the prospect of peasant unrest. Whether as an effect of these 
laws or simply because of convenience, a great deal of seasonal trade loans was unsecured. 
Even if legislation remained ambiguous in effect, the government became 
increasingly interested in local moneylending. One outcome of this growing interest was the 
Banking Enquiry Commission (1929-30), instituted as a fact finding mission to aid the grant 
of full monetary autonomy to India in 1935. The evidence collected during the Banking 
Enquiry contains thick descriptions of money markets, with a level of detail unavailable in 
any enquiry report before or since, and it covered all of India. The Banking Enquiry 
represented the first and the only systematic attempt to collect evidence from a large number 
of actors engaged in the rural money market. This resource has been used little in Indian 
financial history scholarship, even though alternative sources on Indian informal credit are 
scarce. Private archives of indigenous bankers are practically unheard of. 
The paper mainly makes use of these interviews. The interviews are especially useful 
to the paper not only for the institutional details that it contains, but also because a great deal 
of the descriptions relates to seasonality. These descriptions help us reconstruct important 
features of the narrative history of rural credit as well as the organization of the money 
market. To illustrate how narrative history is helped, let us make the plausible assumption 
that the process of commercialization and enlargement of the volume of credit made the 
effect of seasonality-induced risks greater than before. Confirming that assumption, one of 
the earliest systematic histories of Indian banking did not even mention the words “season” 
and “rain”, whereas the Banking Enquiry evidences in the 1920s were pre-occupied with 
seasonality.
12
 To illustrate how this resource sheds light on organization, the interviews tell 
us when the system successfully dealt with the risk and when it failed to adapt to it. No other 
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 Cooke, Rise, Progress, and Present Condition. 
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source on financial history is as detailed as this one to shed light on the link between 
geography and institutions in the financial market. 
The purpose for which this resource is used is to seek explanations for two stylized 
facts about interest rates. 
 
[CHARTS 1 AND 2] 
 
Interest rates: trend and variation 
In agricultural credit operations, three main types of transaction can be distinguished: 
banker-to-banker, banker-to-trader, and trader-to-peasant transactions. Good time-series data 
are available for banker-to-banker transactions alone. In the long run, the average nominal 
and real interest rates in inter-bank transactions either fell or remained stable. The Banking 
Enquiry team examined the old account books of one Gujarati firm Lakshmidas Madhavji of 
Karachi and Porbandar, and discovered that the interest rate on inter-shroff loans was more or 
less fixed at 6 per cent per year from 1795 to 1930.
13
 This was also one of the lowest rates in 
the indigenous money market.
14
 In the more organized segment of the money market that 
transacted with the newly established corporate banks, a similar trend reappeared. This is 
evident in data compiled on the “bazaar rates” (discount rates on the best quality bills of 
exchange), and in the trend in bank rate shown in Chart 1.
15
 The prime banker-to-banker rate 
was the bank rate charged by the Imperial Bank. The Imperial Bank, it has been mentioned, 
formed of a merger of three Presidency Banks, of which the largest was the Bank of Bengal. 
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 Shroff referred to the money-changer, sometimes banker. 
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 Bombay, Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee (PBEC), vol. 1, 199. 
15
 On bazaar rates, Jain, Indigenous Banking, 103. 
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In order to make long run comparisons possible, the paper uses the rate charged by the Bank 
of Bengal (Charts 2 and 1), which again shows a long-term fall, if a marginal fall.
16
 
The second stylized fact can be established from the bank rate data. There were big 
fluctuations between seasons (Charts 1 and 2). The real interest rate fluctuation was higher 
than that in money rates, because the price of food-grain fell during harvest when money 
rates were high, and increased in the rains when money rates were low. The amplitude may 
have fallen somewhat in the long run, but the ground to infer that is not sufficient. 
Whereas the announced bazaar rate and the bank rate applied to banker-to-banker 
transactions, the rates at which merchants would borrow money from the banker and the 
peasant borrow from the merchant were higher than this rate and varied enormously between 
clients and regions. We do not have systematic data on these other interest rates, but only 
some snapshots. In North India, the common rate charged by bankers for loans made out to 
local traders was 9 per cent. Between bankers the rate started from 4½ per cent.
17
 The 
Marwari bankers of Bengal operated in a similar way. They had low rates for intra-
community borrowing, and 9-15 per cent for trade borrowing. Among the Multanis of South 
India, the lending rate of interest was 9-13 per cent. Intra-community loans carried a rate of 6 
per cent. 
The highest interest rates, and seemingly the highest seasonal variation, were reported 
in the sphere of trader-peasant transactions. Early nineteenth century accounts suggest that 
rates in trader-peasant loans were higher than those in the late nineteenth century, falling 
from as high as 50-100 per cent to 12-24.
18
 But even if the average did fall - and the evidence 
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 Similar investigations into the account books of banking firms in North India suggested 
that the trend was variable locally. For example, between 1874 and 1927, it increased 
marginally from 6-7½ per cent to 7-12 per cent, in response to a very large growth in the 
volume of transaction. United Provinces (UP), PBEC, vol. 1, 272. 
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 UP, PBEC, vol. 1, 272. 
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 Cooke, Rise, Progress, and Present Condition, 27. The source of early nineteenth century 
data is Francis Buchanan, later Buchanan Hamilton (1762–1829), an East India Company 
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is slight on this - there was still a huge difference between banker-to-banker loan rate and the 
trader-to-peasant loan rate. The average rate for trader-peasant loan in central India “varies 
from 18 to 75 per cent, the most common rate being 24 per cent.”19 Similar rates appear from 
Bengal. The common rate in Bihar was two per cent per month. The significance of 18 or 24 
is obvious. These numbers allowed the debtor and the creditor to calculate the amount of debt 
outstanding by monthly rather than annual accounting. In turn, monthly accounting was so 
prevalent because the vast majority of the loans were of three to six months in duration and 
were given by individuals who were not always professional bankers, and therefore, relied on 
the simplest accounting rules. In the retail money market, interest rates on short-term loans 
were so high that everybody with any money to spare joined the credit business. Itinerant 
traders, factory owners, shopkeepers, lawyers, teachers, all did loan business on the side 
during the peak season. 
Trader-peasant loan rates varied locally. In arid areas, in land-locked areas, in areas 
that produced one subsistence grain for local consumption, and where transport cost was 
high, interest rates between peasants and bankers tended to be higher than elsewhere. The 
possible explanation is that in such areas bankers received less accommodation from 
metropolitan banking because of low volumes. For evidence, we know that the rate of interest 
fell in the well-connected Coastal Gujarat and rose in the dry tracts of Gujarat. In Bombay, 
seasonal demand for loan was small in extent in the dry tracts according to the District 
Officers, but rose in the cotton cultivation zone of Khandesh, where labourers needed to be 
engaged on a yearly contract, and in the irrigated areas where sugarcane and betel were 
grown.
20
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
officer who led several fact finding missions in newly acquired territories. His reports were 
especially rich on economic matters. 
19
 Central Provinces and Berar (CPB), PBEC, vol. 1, 99. 
20
 Bombay, PBEC, vol. 1, 61. 
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All of these rates also varied seasonally. A large amount of cash reserves of banks 
was converted into trade credit during the peak season, the winter months. To protect its 
reserves, the Imperial Bank (and the Presidency Banks before 1920) increased its bank rate. 
During the main harvest season – January-March - demand for money was at its peak, and 
loan rates between traders and peasants could be as high as 50-100 per cent, though rates 
were a more moderate 12-24 per cent among known clients. By April, the market started 
cooling. In the rains – June-August – the rates crashed and money markets disintegrated as 
movements of capital between small and large centres reduced. 
Why was the inter-year variation in interest rate so great in India? In order to answer 
this question, we need to take a closer look at what seasonality meant for the economy at 
large. 
 
Seasonality 
All over India, with the arrival of the first rains in June from the Southwest monsoon, 
the land was ploughed and sown with the monsoon (kharif) crops, which were rice, millets, 
maize, groundnut (in South India) and cotton. These were usually only rainfed or “wet” 
crops. These were harvested between August and December. Between October and 
December, the winter crops or “rabi” - wheat, barley, and pulses - were sown; these were 
harvested in March-April. The peak harvest season occurred in December and March, when 
the largest number of crops came in to the markets. The winter crops were usually irrigated, 
while also making use of the northeast monsoon or reverse monsoon that brought some 
moisture in most parts of India. The second monsoon was especially strong in eastern coastal 
South India, but not strong enough for extensive cultivation of the more valuable winter 
crops. The major benefit of the northeast monsoon was the ability to produce a wider variety 
of locally consumed grains such as coarse rice. Two cash crops had a slightly different cycle. 
16 
 
Sugarcane was a year-round crop planted in January and harvested next December. Jute was 
sown in February and harvested in July. Both these crops required special conditions, 
sugarcane needed heavy irrigation and jute standing water upon low lands. These, therefore, 
were planted in small areas. Sugarcane harvest contributed to market activity in winter. But 
the effect of the jute harvest was confined locally. 
No region in India in 1920 produced the full basket of kharif and rabi crops. All 
regions grew a basket of monsoon crops. Regions receiving canal and well water, such as 
Punjab, western Gangetic, coastal Andhra, and a few narrow river valleys, also grew a 
number of winter crops. The rest of India grew winter crops relying mainly on the return 
monsoon, and therefore, on a smaller scale than the kharif. Most regions left a large part of 
the cultivable land fallow during summer. 
The busiest credit season started towards the end of October and ended in March. 
During these months the harvest of the monsoon crops and the sowing of the winter crops 
overlapped. A smaller busy season also occurred in June-July when the monsoon ploughing 
required large numbers of labourers to be hired. Peasants needed to borrow money in June to 
meet revenue demand, if any were due, and to hire workers. In most parts of India the cash 
and food reserves of the peasants ran low from April to June, only partially relieved by the 
rabi harvest in April. In the jute growing districts of Bengal, April was the time when 
labourers needed to be hired for weeding jute, and peasants would borrow money. These 
loans were to be repaid in July when the jute harvest came into the market. Almost 
everywhere, peasants growing rice needed to borrow in June and July to hire extra hands for 
the sowing. These loans were to be repaid in December and January.
21
 Merchants needed to 
borrow money to supply advances to the peasants. The June peak in the money market, 
however, was a much weaker one compared with what was to come after October. In 
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 Bengal, PBEC, vol. 2, 566. 
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October-November, many peasants repaid their loans. But demand for money to finance 
commodity trade almost exploded. 
It was not only commodity trade that peaked in winter. Because many types of small 
industry processed agricultural material, industrial operation had a seasonal cycle. Grain 
mills, leather tanning, oil presses, cotton gins, tiles and brick-making, jaggery or raw sugar 
production, worked for a few months in winter. Fishing was a “seasonal industry, for during 
the rains when the rivers are in flood and the lakes and jhils are overflowing, fishing becomes 
impossible.”22 In the dry areas where fodder was scarce, the livestock market moved 
seasonally. Cattle were sold off to breeders and herders at the end of the sowing season. 
These herders took cattle nearer forest areas for grazing. They were repurchased before the 
next sowing season. The practice was reported from Madras and from North India.
23
 Trans-
frontier trade with Tibet, Afghanistan and Central Asia peaked in winter. Frontier 
communities like the Bhotiyas and the Tibetan traders, who were suppliers of wool to the 
plains, remained in the mountains with their herds, spun wool, and cultivated land during 
summer. They descended to the plains to trade in the fairs that occurred in December and 
January. The woollen mills at Kanpur purchased wool from them. Therefore, the mills’ own 
production cycle was bound by the season. If overland trade was activated in winter, so was 
coastal trade because coastal shipping routes became safer to ply in winter. 
The labour market also became more active in November-February. In the western 
Gangetic plains, migrant agricultural labourer gangs were hired for the rabi sowing, 
carpenters and blacksmiths hired workers to produce tools and consumer durables that were 
sold in fairs, and forest contractors hired sawyers in October to cut trees in the Himalayan 
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 UP, PBEC, vol. 1, 238. Jhil: a shallow lake usually formed of rain water. 
23
 For example, UP, PBEC, vol. 4, 238. 
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foothills and supply timber to the railways.
24
 The timber contractors, therefore, needed to 
make borrowings in winter. 
The supply of labour also had a seasonal rhythm. The mill worker in Bombay and 
Calcutta went home to north India during the sowing season in June and the harvest in winter 
- a pattern of circulation the mill managers then and American sociologists later explained as 
a lack of commitment. In fact, many of these workers owned land, and had taken loans from 
traders to finance cultivation back home. They were committed to these traders as well as to 
their employers. In the off season, likewise, there were reverse movements of people out of 
the interior into the towns. “Most of the tenants in their off season go to the neighbouring 
industrial towns. Some of the estates in the Unao district border Cawnpore [a factory town] 
and they get across the Ganges and obtain employment in the mills. Similarly Sandila 
labourers go to Lucknow and get employment there.”25 Since these industries worked in 
winter, it is safe to assume that “off season” here meant the end of the winter agricultural 
season. And since these movements were driven by lack of demand at places of origin, one 
would expect the circular migration to depress the off-season wage. 
Consumption of nearly everything varied according to season. The demand for craft 
goods peaked in winter. After the harvest, many marriages took place. The busy season for a 
craft, therefore, started from a month or two before winter.
26
 The demand for cotton textiles 
was more uniform seasonally than the demand for silk or woollen cloth. But the cotton 
weavers faced idleness in the monsoon months because both local sales and open-air 
processing of yarn slowed down in July and August. For the rural poor, the basket of food 
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articles changed completely between winter and monsoon, and the winter one was bigger and 
more varied.
27
 
Retail sales done in the slack season involved an explicit or implicit credit element. 
The accounts were settled in winter. A lot of retail sale of cloth in rural Bengal was done by 
travelling merchants, who visited their clients in September and returned after harvest in 
December to collect money. The price they charged was higher than the price of these goods 
in the town market. Some of them also made cash loans of three month duration.
28
 In this 
way, private consumption accentuated the seasonal fluctuation in circulation of money. 
Basic infrastructure was a seasonal variable. Transport systems in the zones not 
served by coastal shipping or a railway line broke down during the monsoon and revived in 
winter. In Bombay, “the unmetalled roads are often mere cart tracks useless for traffic in the 
rainy season, especially in Gujerat”.29 In the Haryana plains, “in the rainy season there is a 
wide expanse of water and nothing else.”30 One witness stated that the difference in the price 
of rice was 10-20 per cent between his village and the nearest railway station only two miles 
away in the rainy season.
31
 One would expect that the loan rates would also show a similar 
disposition. Interestingly, the high seasonality of communication may have acted as a reason 
for the local administration not to invest much money in road building. “[T]he seasonal 
nature of the traffic .. hinder the development of motor transport in the rural areas.”32 The 
pressure upon the provincial governments for road building and faster transportation link was 
not very strong, because the peak season for transportation occurred in winter when seasonal 
roads worked fine. 
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Not surprisingly, then, the money market moved through extreme tightness and 
extreme idleness.
33
 “Complaints regarding the tightness of the money market in the mofussil 
during the busy season have been general”, and equally, “inactivity [in the credit market] is 
greatest in May and early June.”34 Why did such seasonal variation persist? What were the 
consequences of the persistence? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to begin 
with a description of the business of banking. 
 
Banking 
 The top players in the money market were the indigenous banking firms based in the 
metropolitan cities (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, and Delhi). They were among the major 
clients of the corporate banks. For example, in Bengal, hundis issued by the Calcutta bankers 
were discounted by the Imperial Bank, and in the slack season, some of the idle money 
moved into Calcutta or Dhaka for deposit in joint-stock banks, which offered a current 
account, or for investment in treasury bills.
35
 The joint-stock banks funded a small (if rising) 
proportion of the trade directly (see Table 1), but more usually they funded the bankers.
36
 The 
indigenous bankers withdrew large sums of money from the Imperial Bank, other corporate 
banks, and the call money market by issuing hundis. In some cases, silver rupee was procured 
from the banks. Some of them had branches in the commodity trading hubs, or knew the local 
bankers. In turn, the local bankers raised money by issuing hundis whenever they could, and 
sent the bills back to the metropolis or sold these to each other. They then loaned this money 
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to traders and landlords who financed cultivation, or they funded smaller moneylenders and 
transport operators. They also did business with traders’ agents, planters, warehouse-owners, 
and rarely, small industries. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Their transactions with the Imperial Bank and with each other involved relatively low 
rates of interest (like the bank rate), extensive use of bills, better personal contacts and 
goodwill, and easier flow of information. In Calcutta and Bombay, for example, large 
settlements of indigenous bankers and a concentration of corporate banking made bankers’ 
bills circulate more easily than in the provincial towns. The money markets in these cities 
were not identical. Banks in Bombay served Indian clients more easily than did the 
European-owned banks in Calcutta. The difference in this respect had more to with the 
structure of indigenous banking than with the policies of the Imperial Bank. There were 
several community-based clusters that competed for the same business in Bombay, the 
Multani (Shikarpur), Marwari, and Gujarati being the leading ones. In Bombay, and to a 
smaller extent in Madras, several communities had an intra-community call money market. 
The internal market was so active that the call money rates often went below the bank rate. 
The call money market was noticeably weaker in Calcutta, even among the Marwari bankers. 
With the hundi business more developed there, interest or discount rates on trade loans were 
lower in Bombay than in Bengal. 
The three segments – banker-banker, banker-merchant, and merchant-peasant – 
overlapped to some extent. But they were also fundamentally distinct, which we know by 
studying the negotiable instruments in each case. Banker-to-banker loans were mainly 
conducted by means of the hundi. There were three types of hundi: payable on sight 
22 
 
(darshani), payable after a period specified in the hundi (muddati, mitidar), and payable after 
a flexible period according to cash flow. The third type prevailed among the Chettiar bankers 
of South India and was known as the nadappu. The legal system found it impossible to 
classify the nadappu, and was quite uncertain about the other types.
37
 Still, the market 
reputation of the issuers was usually secure so that these instruments circulated widely. 
The bankers usually belonged in specific castes and communities, the prominent 
among these being the Multani and the Marwari, the Bengali Saha, Nattukottai Chettiar, 
Kallidaikurichi Brahmins in South India, the Jains and Gujaratis in Bombay, and occasionally 
Rohilla Afghans, though the main business of the last-mentioned was consumption credit. 
The small group of income tax-payers in the 1920s consisted of a few of these bankers. In 
South India, the town banking business was dominated by the Chettiars, the Multanis, the 
Marwaris, and the Kallidaikurichi Brahmins. The Chettiar community business was located 
in Burma until 1930, but considerable transaction was done in Madras as well.
38
 In 1930, 
their involvement with agricultural trade or financing cultivation was minimal, much of the 
business of the Madras firms concentrated on remittance of money through hundis issued by 
them to and from Malaya, Burma, and Madras. By contrast, the small community of Multani 
bankers was sometimes engaged in financing agricultural trade by acting as the intermediary 
between the merchant and the joint-stock bank.
39
 They did not, however, lend directly to the 
peasants or on stock in trade. In busy season, they borrowed from their principals in 
Shikarpur, and also from the Imperial Bank. 
These bankers never financed peasants, but financed each other, and bigger clients 
such as landlords, warehouse owners, merchants with personal reputation, agents of 
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outstation trading firms, tea estates, and traders buying jute, tobacco and chilli crops where 
these cash crops were grown.
40
 They discounted bills of exchange and issued remittance 
instruments like commercial papers when they were branches of Bombay or Calcutta firms, 
or had close links with the latter. They financed merchant-transporters who could furnish bills 
of lading from the railway company. Some of these firms were of a size comparable with that 
of the corporate banks. About six big indigenous banking firms in Calcutta together did as 
much business as the state-run Imperial Bank.
41
 
The biggest indigenous banking firms had dealings with the Imperial Bank. But the 
relationship between the two actors - corporate and family firms - was not always cosy. The 
bankers’ complaints about corporate banks were twofold in nature: that the big banks did not 
give loans or refused acceptance of hundi, or that the big banks encroached on their business. 
In parts of Bombay, the Imperial Bank and other joint-stock banks took over some of the 
hundi business from the indigenous bankers. They competed on discount rates.
42
 The 
indigenous bankers still financed overland trade, but the corporate banks gave the local 
merchants and agents more options. In the same region, the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act 
restrained moneylending, and the new class of merchant-creditors like owners of ginning 
factories that took up the business of agricultural finance preferred to deal with the corporate 
banks.
43
 In Madras, bankers complained that the Imperial Bank stole their clients. “Whenever 
we go to them [managers of Imperial Bank] for discounting our bills, they learn the name of 
the parties themselves and directly approach them and offer them a lower rate of interest”.44 
In Calcutta, some Marwaris complained that the corporate banks did not give enough 
loans. In the assessment of one Marwari banker, the banks’ reluctance to lend stemmed from 
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racial prejudice. “The European business community in Calcutta looks upon Indian firms 
with distrust .. [the European banker’s] decision is influenced by what he hears at the clubs 
from other members.”45 The view that prejudiced discrimination influenced the operation of 
the corporate banks is endorsed in the analysis of a banking history as well.
46
 Racial prejudice 
may well have been present in Calcutta. But complaints on this account were not common at 
all. The sulky remarks cited above overlooked the fact that all bankers lent only to people 
they knew personally. By withholding money from firms whose accounting practices they did 
not understand, the European managers of the Imperial Bank did not do anything that the 
Marwaris did not do to their potential clients. Besides, as we have seen, there was quite a 
different explanation for indigenous bankers to feel resentful towards the Imperial Bank. The 
Imperial Bank was sometimes a threat to the Indian bankers because it bypassed them and 
lent directly to Indian merchants. 
The merchants who took loans from the bankers were a motley group. Their profile 
changed from place to place and crop to crop. Among the larger merchant firms, the use of 
regular accounts and bills was not unknown. In Bengal, during the jute harvest season, 
travelling merchants (bepari, faria) under contract from a middleman, baling firm, or 
warehouse-owner (aratdar) went into the jute market, met the moneylenders who had 
financed the peasants, and bought goods. Their principals were financed by the professional 
bankers or corporate banks.
47
 The loans that these principals took could be in the form of a 
direct cash advance. “In Dacca some banking firms make direct cash advances on personal 
credit to the tradesmen either for purchasing imported goods for distribution and sale or for 
gathering local produces for export.”48 More commonly, the merchant would sign a 
promissory note or cash a hundi with the banker. Among the banking firms of Bengal, there 
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was a further distinction between the Marwari and the Bengali, the distinction being that the 
former was often the branch of a Calcutta firm, and the Bengalis were locals. In the big jute 
market of Tangail, the Bengali Sahas, the Marwaris, the Imperial Bank and other joint-stock 
banks all financed merchants. The Marwari buyers were agents of Marwari bankers of 
Calcutta.
49
 
Like in Bengal, the bankers located in the market towns of western India financed 
internal trade and had outstation, even overseas, branches. They financed commodity trade 
overland and small industrial firms.
50
 The usual practice was that in the harvest season, the 
merchant or trading agent would buy goods by borrowing from a local banker who had ties 
with a metropolitan banker. For example, in the cotton export trade in coastal Gujarat a local 
agent would ship the cotton by railway to the principal merchant in Bombay. The Bombay 
firm would ask, through a chithi or hand-note, a local banker to pay the agent. On delivering 
the railway receipt to the European export firm, say, Ralli Brothers, the Bombay firm 
received a draft, which was sent to the local banker.
51
 In Central India, export merchants in 
cotton like the Ralli Brothers or Japanese trading firms, operated in the way export merchants 
operated elsewhere. They opened agency in the trading town during the busy season, and 
financed their purchases by obtaining money from bankers, corporate banks, and the firms’ 
head offices.
52
 
Trading firms like the Ralli would of course make use of bankers’ bills. But in the 
majority of banker-to-trader transaction, bills were rarely used. Most loans were unsecured 
and taken or given on the basis of a hand-note. These hand-notes were not known to have 
been traded. Of course, the extent of the dependence of merchants upon bankers would vary 
between regions. One indicative figure comes from Delhi, where, in the busy season 75 per 
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cent of trade capital was provided by the traders’ own money, which would include 
unsecured loans, and 25 per cent was raised with darshani hundis.
53
 But Delhi was a big city. 
Once we step out of banker-to-banker transactions in metropolitan cities, hundi became rare. 
Numerous statements in the Banking Enquiry showed this: “Very little part is played by 
negotiable instruments in the internal trade”; “the use of hundi is gradually dying out”; “the 
discounting of hundis plays only a small part as compared with the use of cash”; “hundis are 
very rare” or “very rare in the rural parts”; “very few know what a hundi is”.54 In the remoter 
areas of Central Provinces, “For internal trade of the province very little use is made of hundi 
cheques, etc., because only a few big bankers in cities deal in them.”55 In the uplands and 
forested tracts, merchants did not even have a fixed location even. In the land-locked Central 
Provinces, the grain merchants were mobile transporters. Their caravan operations required 
taking loans. These loans were known as khep or trip.
56
 There was no chance that in the 
distant markets that they covered the trade bill or the hand-note would be accepted or that 
their own hand-note would have much marketable value. 
In trader-to-peasant loans, land mortgage was sometimes used, though not nearly as 
much as may be expected. “One remarkable fact is that the sowkars do not insist on mortgage 
or any other security”.57 The transaction cost in the shape of time and money to settle a law 
suit was generally high. Where this statement came from (Central Provinces), land was not 
usually valuable because of poor transport connection or poor soil quality. Even when land 
was valuable and loans were secured, taking possession of mortgaged assets was not easy. 
Land mortgage deals were covered in several provinces by laws preventing land transfer. The 
case of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, which completely outlawed land mortgage with non-
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landlords, is an example. The Act had the effect of turning all trader-peasant loans into 
landlord-peasant loans.
58
 By confining the mortgage market in this way, provincial 
jurisdiction would ensure that mortgage deeds were not tradable instruments. 
Most loans were unsecured loans, and exposed to default risk. As one bank officer of 
Bengal reported, “it may be safely assumed that 50 per cent of such loans .. becomes 
ultimately irrecoverable”.59 Even if the percentage is an exaggeration, the risk was no doubt 
high. The bankers, therefore, charged more interest when lending to non-banker client. And 
all lenders, even those who accepted hundi, tried to mitigate risk with personal knowledge of 
the client. No one lent to any borrower whose circumstaces were not fully known. In 
response to the question, how bankers secured trust, a Marwari witness of Bengal replied, 
“they know the people they are dealing with.”60 In western India too, “a remarkable feature of 
the indigenous banking system is the banker”s close personal touch with the customer. He 
knows the history of the family of his borrower and the details concerning his business and 
financial position.”61 In big deals, a certain degree of transparency was maintained. 
“Indigenous bankers deal principally with men of business or the educated... They regularly 
supply their clients with copies of their accounts. Our evidence proves past doubt that, 
whatever may be said of some moneylenders, the indigenous bankers’ code of honesty is very 
high.”62 The Chettiar bankers lent money only “relying on their estimate of their clients’ 
worth and reputation among their banking community”.63 The rate of interest too depended 
on such knowledge. “The rate of interest varies with the status and the property of the 
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borrower”, or in another statement from the same region, “the rate of interest on unsecured 
loan depends on the character of the borrower”.64 
Community ties surely served to ensure transparency and acted as a channel of 
information flow. For one Marwari, dealing with another Marwari might mean a discount in 
interest rate in banker-to-banker borrowings. But such “social capital” is apt to be taken too 
seriously. The social ties between the big-city and the small-town bankers were not 
necessarily close, even when both were Marwari or Multani. Not all Marwari firms were 
linked in principal-agent relationships, in fact, few were. The local bankers treated their 
counterparts as business associates more than as elders or relatives. Between bankers, 
merchants, and peasants, there was no question of sharing social capital. They belonged in 
different worlds. 
We are now closer to answering the question that this paper started from: how do we 
define and explain the success and failure of the financial system? The money market 
succeeded in expanding credit volume in the long run thanks to the institutional strengths of 
the banker-to-banker market. The key point of strength was the hundi. In principle, rise in 
trade volumes should see an expansion in the volume of bills, particularly usance bills, which 
should expand supply of money to trade. With the bills retiring three to six months later, the 
circulation of money should even out between seasons. This is more or less what happened in 
overseas trade between India and Britain with the government-backed Council Bill system. 
To some extent, the same thing happened with banker-banker lending. Corporate banks and 
large banking firms issued bills. The long-run fall in interest rate suggests that bills did 
circulate more widely over time, and that the banking business grew in pace with trade. 
But that was the long-run trend. Between seasons, credit supply remained uneven. 
The sharp rise in the seasonal interest rates showed that the bills failed to circulate below the 
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banker-to-banker level, leading contemporary critics of Indian banking to complain of 
“inelasticity” of the supply of money in response to trade demand.65 Interest rates differed 
between segments because bills were more or less confined to the banker-banker layer. Hundi 
was rarely used between merchants and bankers. Reputation failed to secure transactions on 
easy terms when these transactions crossed the borders of community, personal knowledge of 
clients, and familiar trades. 
A key question, then, is why hundi was not traded more widely. The hundi was a 
small and derived instrument. Its acceptance derived, as in every other partially legislated 
customary instrument, from personal knowledge and personal security. The reach of that 
knowledge was limited. Hundis were discounted either by a member of the same community 
that issued it or by the Imperial Bank on the guarantee of a local shroff. The Bank could 
convert these into cash by selling them to the Paper Currency Department. But because its 
own clients were fussy, the Bank was selective in its choice of hundi, and because of 
brokerage, its commission was high. Still, discounting hundi was less of a problem in 
Calcutta or Bombay because of the density both of corporate banks and community firms. In 
the largest trading towns in the interior, say, Patna, Benares or Kanpur (Cawnpore), hundi 
had a good chance of being accepted by the Imperial Bank or other large corporate banks, or 
it could be sent to Bombay or Calcutta for encashment. But in the smaller towns located in 
the agricultural tracts, hundi was not a useful instrument.  
There were many obstacles to the wider usage of hundi. Law was at best ambiguous. 
“There is no legal definition of a hundi. It is governed by the custom and usages of the 
various localities, and only where no specific custom exists does it come under the term ‘bill 
of exchange’ within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”66 As court cases 
showed, contract enforcement was often dependent upon the meaning of the hundi in 
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particular contexts.
67
 They were cashable only in the town mentioned on the document. Few 
bankers entertained a hundi without personal knowledge of the drawee. “No hundis from 
strangers” were allowed by the Kallidaikurichi Brahmin bankers.68 The same thing was said 
of the Marwaris and the Chettiars. Cooperative banks were not permitted to discount hundi.
69
 
Few corporate banks discounted hundis with the Imperial Bank, deterred by the charges of 
the latter. Witnesses including bankers complained that the hundi was not secure enough as it 
was not regulated enough by law.
70
 In short, it was not a good candidate for a bill market 
unless, as some bankers suggested to the Central Banking Enquiry Committee, “legislation 
[were] passed standardizing the essential features of the hundi”.71 
Given the facts that the bill was not a perfect instrument and that it was poorly 
marketable, banking firms needed to make a lot of their transactions in liquid cash. The 
strategy of the indigenous bankers was to attain flexibility to expand and contract commodity 
market financing, which in the absence of a bill market of sufficient depth required them to 
keep a large part of their wealth in cash. “During the busy season when demand for cash is 
great, bankers keep as high a cash balance as possible.”72 There was a high premium on 
liquidity. The Presidency Banks carried relatively large cash reserves, several times their 
investment, and the cash balances would have been deployed in short loans and bill 
discounting when needed. The ability to tap cash and jewellery was a source of strength for 
the Marwari entrepreneurs of Calcutta. The Marwaris regularly lent on gold. Even as the 
hoarding of gold was falling out of fashion among the general public, among the Saha 
merchant-bankers, gold hoarding continued.
73
 In common with bankers elsewhere, the 
                                                          
67
 Martin, “Economic History”. 
68
 Madras, PBEC, vol. 2, 75. 
69
 Bihar and Orissa, PBEC, vol. 2, 86. 
70
 Bihar and Orissa, PBEC, vol. 2, 120. 
71
 India, Indian Central Banking, 412. 
72
 CPB, PBEC, vol. 1, 340. 
73
 Bengal, PBEC, vol.  3, 127. 
31 
 
Chettiars kept an enormously large proportion of their wealth in cash; in one estimate, Rs. 
800-900 million in cash, as against 150-200 million in property and other tangible wealth for 
the community as a whole.
74
 In the 1920s, there was an ongoing decline in usance or muddati 
hundi.
75
 Darshani or sight hundis were more liquid (that is, carried less commission) and 
accepted more readily. The changeover also meant that the hundis were losing their role as 
bills and becoming more of a demand draft, gaining liquidity but losing the capacity to act as 
a credit multiplier. 
Indigenous banking, therefore, was a limitedly capable agent. Could corporate 
banking offer a better system? 
 
Corporate banking 
The Banking Enquiry witnesses often looked back to a historical change. Around 
1870, indigenous bankers lent money to local merchants and warehouse owners, who in turn 
financed peasants. “Formerly the whole of the internal trade of the province was financed by 
them”.76 The indigenous bankers did not have enough resources of their own to fund the 
excess demand for money. But almost all of them had liquid stores of wealth, could access 
parent firms, belonged in the same community as the local bankers, and thus take advantage 
of relatively low rates. A middle layer of the banking business consisted of bankers who 
mediated between the big traders and the metropolitan or corporate bankers. This layer had 
become partially corporatized by 1930. The 1913 Company Act distinguished banks from 
other companies, which acted as an impetus to the change. The War had also led to 
accumulation of profits that were converted into banking capital. In the major market towns 
that dealt in cash crops, service workers and landlords who had no prior ties with banking, set 
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up “loan offices” and cooperative societies. Some of these organizations arose from 
community and caste-bound lending operations, and continued to operate amongst people 
who were not only known to each other professionally but also belonged in the same caste 
(the Nadar Bank of Tuticorin cited earlier being one example). These organizations did the 
same type of credit business as did the indigenous bankers, but differed from the latter in that 
they usually received deposits. In fact, these deposits sometimes came from the indigenous 
bankers.
77
 This layer of small corporate firms gave the indigenous bankers some competition, 
but was constrained by the fact that bill rediscounting did not function to their advantage. 
They were too small and too local to be well known. They had difficulty raising money to 
meet sudden shortfalls. Furthermore, if the corporate form reduced liability and helped raise 
funds, it also brought in new risks. 
The small banks that frequently formed of locally accumulated wealth, suffered from 
a high mortality. Bank mortality remains a poorly understood phenomenon in Indian history. 
Along with lax regulation and insider lending, there was another factor, an overexpansion in 
deposits just before a run.
78
 My interpretation of the high mortality is that there was a 
fundamental disparity between the asset and liability of these banks imparted by exposure to 
agriculture and agricultural seasonality. Deposit expansion accentuated the disparity to a 
dangerous level. In a good agricultural year, the Bengal loan offices were solvent, in a bad 
year they faced the problem that their interest obligation on the deposits did not vary in time 
with the returns of loans made out. The outflow was not a seasonal one, the inflow was 
seasonal. 
Because the short-term money market sucked in resources, it became expensive to 
attract long-term deposit. This imparted a seasonal modulation on the deposits with the 
corporate banks. Deposit volumes rose in busy season and fell in the slack season. “No one 
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who has any practical experience can conceive how the [banking] companies strive and 
scramble to secure deposits.”79 Mid-level banks had to offer dangerously high returns to 
depositors. Furthermore, whereas an individual indigenous banker had a lender of last resort 
in Bombay or Calcutta, the corporate bank working in the countryside often operated on its 
own, and in too small a scale to draw on own reserves. When they were heavily committed to 
one activity, say tea or jute, and that activity faced a cash shortage, the banks suffered a cash 
shortage.
80
 Corporate banks, cooperatives, land mortgage banks, and loan offices were prone 
to corruption as well. In an exceptionally tight money market, the clerk of the cooperative 
bank would charge the market rate to the bank’s clients on the side while writing the 
regulated lower rate on the books, or ask for presents from them before approving a loan.
81
 
What did the government do to mitigate these problems? Despite the presence of the 
government-owned Imperial Bank, and its predecessors the Presidency Banks, corporate 
banking was not a product of government intervention. These banks had limited exposure to 
agriculture. “The part played by Government in agricultural finance in normal times is 
practically nil.”82 In North India, the government advanced some money as long-term 
agricultural loan, called taqavi. But its scale was limited, and it suffered from other 
distortions. Peasants, for example, routinely took taqavi to settle their debts with private 
bankers. Officials and experts cautioned repeatedly that the government could not become 
efficient bankers because “collection of interest and principal from the agriculturists entails 
troubles .. a large staff has to be maintained. Recourse to law courts will be frequent and 
consequent law expenses will be heavy”.83 The government did play a role in regulating 
interest rates. In every province the governments introduced a legal ceiling on interest rate 
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and restrictions on land transfers. For example, the Usurious Loans Act regulated the interest 
rate in Bengal. According to nearly all witnesses, the Act exerted only a notional influence, 
since very few cases were ever filed with reference to the Act. Still, new corporate lenders 
such as the cooperative banks and loan offices were bound by the regulation to moderate their 
interest demand. The judiciary also interfered in the money market. The standard interest rate 
in Bengal for secured loans was 12 per ecnt, and unsecured loans 24 per cent. These were not 
the prevailing rates, nor fixed by law, but the rates that the district judges were willing to 
accept as the standard. That is, if the real rate charged were higher, the judge could apply 
discretion and bring it down to these floors. Such cases, however, were rare. 
If corporate banks muddled through the deposit business, most indigenous bankers 
were reluctant to engage in it. Again, my reading is that seasonality was responsible. Whereas 
the assets were highly seasonal, the obligation to pay interest was a non-seasonal one. Of 
course, banking communities differed in this respect. One of the distinctive features of 
Chettiar bankers was said to be their deposit business. They accepted public deposits, allowed 
cheques to be drawn, and offered better interest rates than joint-stock banks.
84
 But this part of 
their work was in decline after they shifted a large part of the capital to Burma. The bigger of 
the Bombay banking firms accepted deposits, though they did not allow cheques.
85
 This 
deposit business was not very large, and outside Bombay it did not flourish. According to the 
testimony of a Surat banker, the public preferred the corporate banks for deposit because the 
latter published their accounts.
86
 Even when deposits were accepted, the bankers maintained 
strict selection of the clients. “Indigenous bankers receive deposits generally from those 
people who are closely related or on most intimate terms with them”.87 This selection was 
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surely necessary to avoid a run on the bank, say, in winter when a large withdrawal of deposit 
would be most inconvenient to deal with. 
Because the inflow was in cash and seasonal, the largest volume of investment was 
formed of short-term loans, as the next section shows. 
 
Investment 
Most trader-to-peasant loans were of three months duration or shorter and taken in the 
slack season to be repaid in the harvest season. In turn, the credit market for long-term loans 
was conspicuously undeveloped. Loans of duration more than one year were hard to find. For 
any term longer than one season, the lender insisted on mortgage. A report prepared by the 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, a body consisting mainly of traders, estimated that of the total 
outstanding debt of Bengal of Rs. 930 million (1930), 440 million was secured by a 
mortgage, 180 million was unsecured, and 310 million was seasonal and unsecured.
88
 A 
District Officer further clarified that non-seasonal loans rarely exceeded one year.
89
 Very 
short loans that were contracted and repaid within a few months consisted of half of the stock 
of debt in agricultural regions around Delhi.
90
 
One historian of Indian banking, S.K. Muranjan, made a comparison of the short-term 
rate and long-term rate of interest. The analysis suggested a reason why lending short-term 
was so attractive. He showed that the short-term rate exceeded the long-term rate in India, 
whereas in the large money markets of the world, the opposite was usually the case.
91
 
Muranjan’s was a dubious exercise because the rates chosen for comparison (the bank rate 
and the yield on long-maturity government stock) related to what I call the banker-to-banker 
market. Instruments in use in that market were not representative of those in the other money 
                                                          
88
 Bengal, PBEC, vol. 1, 244. 
89
 Bengal, PBEC, vol. 2, 37. 
90
 India, Banking Enquiry, vol. 1, 68. 
91
 Muranjan, Modern Banking, 43. 
36 
 
markets. Still, the comparison has useful lessons. In the countries compared with India, 
money supply into the short-term asset market was more elastic than it was in India. In India, 
by contrast, the bank rate was too dependent on the cash reserves of banks, and relatedly, on 
the very high seasonal peak. Only rarely (as in 1891-2, 1916-8), a sudden rise in cash 
reserves led to the fall in the short rate. A more decisive change occurred in the mid-1930s 
when the short rate crashed due to an agricultural depression and widespread liquidation of 
private holdings of gold and silver. 
If money rushed into the interior during the busy season, between April and August, 
bankers “sat yawning behind their desks” and found it difficult to profitably invest idle 
money.
92
 In North India, “money advanced to traders is active only during the busy seasons 
and lies idle for about five months”.93 And in the South, “it is becoming more and more 
apparent that during certain seasons of the year large amounts of capital get concentrated in 
the hands of the provincial bank and it is found that there is no profitable method of 
investment.” One investment option was government securities, but these were losing value 
in the 1920s.
94
 The Chettiar bankers transferred funds in the slack season to Rangoon, 
Malaya, and the Straits.
95
 For small corporate banks that lent only to specific trades in which 
caste members had trading interest, there was no banking in the rains. “Only during busy 
season we do moneylending business. There is no business for other months.”96 In North 
India, there was an inter-bank market in hundi during the slack season. Those bankers who 
anticipated more business in the peak season would buy up hundis from others at a lower rate 
than in the busy season.
97
 Also, hundis could be bought at par from bankers engaged in 
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seasonal operations by merchants, such as cloth merchants, whose business was year-round.
98
 
But these were not very common forms of employment of surplus money. 
 “There is at present complete divorce between banks and industry”.99 This is 
something of a puzzle, for surely, long-term loans backed by a good mortgage faced no legal 
hurdles as they did with agricultural land, and received the backing of contract law. 
Moreover, bank deposit, while it varied with season, did increase in the long run. That is, 
there was a secular rise in the seasonally non-sensitive component of bank liability. The 
number of account holders increased in the joint-stock banks. In principle it was possible to 
protect long-term loans with long-term deposits. In reality, banks found it hard not to mix up 
the short and long components, financed seasonal trade with deposit, and took on undue risks 
upon themselves during bad trading seasons. A contemporary writer speculated that the 
indigenous bankers preferred to invest long-term in land. However, if the data on Chettiar 
investment is representative, the scale of land investment was not all that large.
100
 
If banks did not finance industry, who did? Big companies of Calcutta floated shares 
and used their own reserves to fund investment. They also borrowed from the Imperial Bank 
and other Calcutta joint-stock banks to finance working capital. Big companies of Bombay 
and Ahmedabad were more successful in attracting deposits from indigenous bankers.
101
 
Some of the newly established cotton mills in the interior relied on this mode of financing. 
The reliance on deposits of bankers, however, carried risks of a run on the company when 
commodity trade demand was large. On the other hand, small firms borrowed from friends 
and relations to finance investment and borrowed from buyers to finance working capital. 
It was the mid-level firm with need of substantial loan that was starved of funds. Two 
examples will illustrate the problem. In Assam, tea estates were mainly owned by European 
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companies. In the Dooars region of Bengal, however, estates of small size were owned by 
Bengali professionals. Both the European estates and the Bengali estates sold tea in the 
Calcutta auctions, but the latter found it impossible to be financed by the Calcutta banks. The 
Imperial Bank funded the European planters, subject to guarantees issued by the tea brokers, 
who were also European firms. These brokers - Figgis, Cresswell, Carrit-Moran, J. Thomas 
being the main players - refused to guarantee the Bengali ventures. In the Banking Enquiry 
evidences, the refusal was seen as an effect of collusion. There was possibly another reason 
for the refusal. The brokers’ main business was certifying the quality of tea, which was 
crucial to selling tea in the London auctions, and the Bengali estates were known to produce 
poorer and unbrandable quality of tea. In any case, these estates borrowed money from 
Marwari bankers at 12-21 percent.
102
 
A second example comes from the interview of a Bengali entrepreneur Surendra 
Mohan Bose. I pick this example because Bose did not come from a business community, 
and yet left a business legacy. He was proprietor with his brothers of Bengal Waterproof, 
Bangeshwari Cotton Mills, a tea estate and a soap factory. Bose was imprisoned around 
World War I for anti-Briitsh activities, educated himself in California, and returned to 
become an entrepreneur. In every way acceptable as a potential client of a corporate bank, 
Bose had to face “great difficulty in financing purchase of raw materials”.103 He had often to 
borrow from the Marwai bankers at 15-18 per cent, and pay high rates of commission on bills 
discounted at banks. The managing agents of another successful industrial firm, Calcutta 
Chemicals, reported that persuading a bank, in this case an Indian-owned bank, to open 
trading account to a mid-level industrial firm was an almost impossible task. The banks 
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accepted the request more readily when the firm had the Government as its main client, but 
not otherwise.
104
 
Why did the mid-level firms find it so hard to get cheaper money? Or to ask the 
question differently, why did the bankers prefer to keep their money idle for four to six 
months in a year instead of lending long-term? An answer to the question is that their 
personal knowledge network included commodity traders and not industrialists. Besides, 
indigenous bankers were said to be nervous about parting with their cash balances. “Bankers 
feel the burden of great financial anxiety when they begin to tie up their resources in the slack 
season.”105 “It is not possible to utilise these funds in lending and borrowing .. as the money 
is required” to fund seasonal demand. The joint stock banks worked in the same way. The 
Imperial Bank was said to be willing to fund industry, but its rate for industry increased well 
above the bank rate if the loan was made in the busy season.
106
 Financing plans of 
manufacturing firms, thus, needed to mind at least three things not directly linked to technical 
efficiency - the quality of the agricultural season, the cost of loans, and the risk of a sudden 
demand for repayment. 
 
Conclusion: Three lessons for comparative history 
The paper shows that a sound banking system and the wider use of negotiable 
instruments made it possible for credit supply to grow in step with commercialization of 
agriculture. Even as the long-run problem was tackled, the money market continued to 
experience extreme seasonal fluctuations. Liquid instruments like cash or gold were preferred 
to bills to achieve flexibility in seasonal transactions. In principle, the government could do 
more to improve the negotiability of instruments like hand-notes and land mortgages among 
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grain traders and peasants. But these remained limited in circulation because of weak 
legislation and adverse regulation like anti-moneylender laws. 
The story outlined above leads me to advance three propositions of potential 
significance for comparative history. First, geography influenced the process of financial 
modernization. The general point that geography, in particular the tropical monsoon, shaped 
the prospect of economic development is a familiar one in global economic history.
107
 So far 
the literature exploring the link lacks coherence and has little relevance for a study of either 
financial development or agricultural development. This is an important gap because 
agriculture was directly influenced by climate and was the largest livelihood in India. The 
paper meets that gap by showing how seasonality might shape the level of financial 
intermediation in the countryside. 
A second and related proposition is that, having to deal with seasonality made 
indigenous banking firms unsuitable agents to fund industrialization. Because liquidity was 
so important, bankers and merchants preferred to keep their capital idle in the slack season. 
Some of them were also reluctant to accept public deposit, which was a non-seasonal 
liability. These conditions explain why the system was poorly equipped to make profitable 
use of slack season surplus, to make better use of household savings, or to extend credit to 
industrial enterprise. There was, in other words, a trade-off between agricultural use of capital 
and industrial use of capital. Seasonality was the key to that trade-off. 
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The third proposition concerns the role of the state, specifically, commercial 
legislation. Legislation was constrained by political factors, which slowed institutional 
development. The scholarship on negotiable instruments in other regions of the world has 
shown that courts had an important function in achieving “clarity and uniformity” of 
commercial law, in freeing commercial papers from the influence of “localism,” and in 
making the interest of trade rather than the profile of the litigant the centre of jurisdiction.
108
 
These actions were never an easy matter because local conventions could represent a strong 
political force as well as the convenience of path dependence. British Indian legislation 
needed to do much more to break these local conventions and standardize negotiable 
instruments. Some contemporary bankers also wanted intervention, and the decision to 
conduct a large scale banking enquiry in 1929-30 was in part an effort to understand local 
conventions. The state, however, did far less than it needed to. Designing an instrument that 
would be liquid enough to meet seasonal fluctuations could not have been an easy matter in 
any case. More than that, the state was torn between two contradictory pulls, to help 
commercial institutions develop, and to slow, even stifle institutional development in order to 
avoid the peasant losing land. The conservative drive stemmed partly from the fact that the 
bankers did not form a unified lobby. More fundamentally, it stemmed from a pro-peasant 
and anti-moneylender political ideology shared by a large number of British Indian 
administrators, an ideology that carried over into independent India. 
Soon enough, political shift was to rule out any reformist agenda altogether. The 
discourse on what could be done to make private moneylending efficient disappeared after 
independence in 1947. The independent state, which started with a fierce anti-moneylender 
ideology, took steps to practically outlaw indigenous banking and closely regulate 
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agricultural trade to the extent that supporting institutions of private trade was not seriously 
discussed thereafter. 
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Chart 1. Bank rate, Bank of Bengal, average over the years (top) and standard deviation of 
monthly values (bottom). Source: Reserve Bank of India, Banking and Monetary Statistics. 
 
 
Chart 2. Bank rate, Bank of Bengal, seasonal variation. Source: Same as in Chart 1. 
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Table 1. Growth of banks and bank finance of trade 1870-1934 
 Deposit Bank 
investment 
(a) 
GDP in 
commercial 
services (b) 
a/b 
(%) 
 Corporate 
banks 
Cooperatives Total  Percentage 
of GDP 
 
1870-5 132.4  133.2  18   
1890-5 289.2  364.8  32.2   
1910-5 935 29 1130.2 5.4 70.6 2735 2.6 
1930-5 2224.6 456.4 3139.8 13.0 317.4 2772 11.5 
Notes: Source of banking data is the same as in Charts 1 and 2. Source of GDP data: 
Sivasubramonian, National Income. Bank investment is the investment of Presidency Banks 
until 1920 and the “advances” made by the Imperial Bank thereafter. The data is incomplete. 
All values in Rs. million. The investment figures are for the first year of each quinquennium. 
 
 
48 
 
 
Map. British Indian Provinces (shaded), States, and main cities 
